

Message Text

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SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HERewith FULL TEXT HENRY BRADSHER FRONT PAGE BYLINER
WASHINGTON STAR WEDNESDAY DECEMBER 29 HEADED "IS THE U.S.
SURVIVING ON STALE STRATEGIC CONCEPTS?"

2. THE WORLD KEEPS CHANGING. THE FOREIGN POLICY AND
MILITARY SITUATIONS FACING THE UNITED STATES TODAY ARE
VERY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF TWO DECADES AGO.

3. THE OLD SIMPLICITY OF A NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION BETWEEN
A SOVIET-LED EAST AND AN AMERICAN-LED WEST HAS BLURRED
INTO THE COMPLICATIONS OF MANY ADDITIONAL FACTORS OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. WEAPONRY HAS NEW, MORE COMPLEX
CAPABILITIES OF UNCLEAR IMPLICATIONS. VIETNAM AND OTHER
NONNUCLEAR WARS HAVE AFFECTED U.S. PERCEPTIONS OF FOREIGN
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AFFAIRS AS WELL AS WILLINGNESS TO TAKE ACTIONS ABROAD.

4. BUT ONE THING HAS CHANGED ONLY LITTLE. U.S. STRATEGIC
CONCEPTS ABOUT SURVIVING IN THE WORLD HAVE SCARCELY PRO-
GRESSED BEYOND THE 1950S.

5. THERE IS A SMALL, INCREASING CIRCLE OF PERSONS IN
WASHINGTON THAT THINKS THIS IS POTENTIALLY PERILOUS FOR
THE NATION'S SECURITY. CONCEPTS THAT ARE NOT ADAPTED TO

PRESENT REALITIES LEAD TO INADEQUATE OR JUST PLAIN WRONG POLICIES WITHOUT MUCH AWARENESS OF THE POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS MISTAKES.

6. BUT THE POLICY-MAKERS ARE OFTEN TOO CAUGHT UP IN IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS TO RE-EXAMINE THE BASIC IDEAS THAT GUIDE THEM. SOME OBSERVERS THINK THAT ONLY STRONG SUPPORT FROM THE WHITE HOUSE CAN ENCOURAGE FRESH CONCEPTUAL THINKING--BUT NOT GUARANTEE IT, SINCE IT TAKES MORE THAN JUST ORDERS, IT TAKES INSPIRATION.

7. THE JUST-DISCLOSED REVISION BY THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF ITS ESTIMATE OF SOVIET MILITARY INTENTIONS, SO AS NOW TO CREDIT THE KREMLIN WITH SEEKING MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THE UNITED STATES INSTEAD OF WANTING ONLY PARITY, EMPHASIZES THE NEED FOR INSPIRATION.

8. THE EASY REACTION BY THE UNITED STATES TO THIS NEW EVALUATION WOULD BE TO SEEK MORE AND BETTER OF THE SAME OLD MILITARY ANSWERS TO PERCEIVED THREATS. IN FACT, HOWEVER, SOME KEY PIECES OF THE FRAMEWORK OF STRATEGIC CONCEPTS UPON WHICH THE OLD ANSWERS WERE BUILT ARE BEING CHALLENGED BY THE SOVIET REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE THEORETICAL BASES OF AMERICAN IDEAS.

9. THE IDEAS THAT DEVELOPED IN THE '50S HAVE BECOME PART OF THE COMMON LANGUAGE OF WORLD AFFAIRS. THE BALANCE OF UNCLASSIFIED

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TERROR, MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION AND OTHER MEGADEATH CONCEPTS ARE THE ACCEPTED BACKGROUND TO CURRENT THINKING BOTH WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND AMONG THE GENERAL PUBLIC.

10. SUCH IDEAS WERE DEVELOPED BY INTELLECTUALS WITH WELL KNOWN NAMES LIKE HENRY A. KISSINGER AND HERMAN KAHN, WHILE LITTLE-KNOWN ONES LIKE THOMAS C. SCHELLING CONTRIBUTED TO CONCEPTS OF MANAGING SUPERPOWER DISPUTES AND OTHER ASPECTS OF LIVING WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEY WERE INFLUENTIAL IN SHAPING SUCH MAJOR AMERICAN POLICIES AS THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE MILITARY CONCEPT OF THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION, WHICH SOUGHT TO FILL THE HOLE LEFT BY THE PRESUMED UNUSUABILITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE SYSTEM.

11. THERE HAS BEEN A TENDENCY IN RECENT YEARS IN BOTH GOVERNMENTAL AND ACADEMIC CIRCLES TO ASSUME THAT ALL OF THE STRATEGIC THINKING HAS BEEN DONE AND NOW IT IS ONLY

NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT IDEAS FROM "THE GOLDEN AGE" OF THE '50S AND EARLY '60S. ATTENTION IS FOCUSED ON FOREIGN POLITICAL AND MILITARY PROBLEMS IN TERMS OF BUDGET CYCLES PLOTTED AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF KNOWN STRATEGIC CONCEPTS,

WITHOUT ANY ORIGINAL LOOKS BEING TAKEN AT FRESH WAYS
TO APPROACH THOSE PROBLEMS.

12. SOME OF THE GREAT NAMES FROM THAT GOLDEN AGE, LIKE
KAHN AND SCHELLING, THINK THAT THE IDEAS THAT LIE BEHIND
U.S. SECURITY HAVE GOTTEN OUT OF DATE. THE AUTHOR OF A
BOOK ON STRATEGY WHO LATELY HAS BEGUN STIMULATING SOME
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN MINDS ON THE SUBJECT, JOHN M.
COLLINS OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONTENDS THAT THE
UNITED STATES IS SURVIVING ON "STALE STRATEGIC CONCEPTS."

13. IT HAS SURVIVED SO FAR BECAUSE THE COMPETITION HAS
NOT BEEN TOO TOUGH, COLLINS SAYS, BUT THE MILITARY BALANCE
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IS SHIFTING AWAY FROM A CONFIDENT AMERICAN CONTROL OF
ITS DESTINY.

14. SIMPLY BUYING EVERY CONCEIVABLE TYPE OF NEW WEAPONS
IS NOT THE ANSWER, ACCORDING TO COLLINS. THE MAN IN THE
STREET HAS A VITAL INTEREST IN UP-TO-DATE, COHESIVE
STRATEGIC THINKING THAT INSURES HIS SECURITY WITHOUT
WASTING HIS MONEY ON UNNECESSARY WEAPONS WHOSE LONG-TERM
NEED HAS NOT BEEN THOUGHT OUT.

15. A MEMBER OF SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER'S BRAIN
TRUST WHO DEALS WITH SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS, DR. HELMUT
SONNENFELDT, SAYS THE CHANGED SITUATION TODAY "CALLS FOR
NEW INTEGRATED THINKERS. THE RISING COST OF DEFENSE,
THE VULNERABILITY OF LAND-BASED WEAPONS SYSTEMS, THE
POSSIBILITY OF RADICALLY NEW WEAPONS LIKE DEATH RAYS, THE
INCREASING 'THIRD WORLD' COMPLICATIONS TO THE OLD BIPOLAR
RELATIONSHIP--ALL THESE MEAN THAT WE CANNOT REST ON OUR
INTELLECTUAL OARS."

16. A NUMBER OF HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIALS SAY, HOWEVER, THAT IT
IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT ITSELF TO COME UP WITH
THE THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO MILITARY AND POLITICAL
AFFAIRS WHICH ARE THE STRATEGIC BACKGROUND TO CURRENT
POLICIES. THE GOVERNMENT IS ORGANIZED TO COPE WITH
OBVIOUS PROBLEMS, NOT TO ORIGINATE IDEAS.

17. ONE OFFICIAL FINDS "A GENERALIZED ILL WILL IN THE
GOVERNMENT TODAY TOWARD THE THINK TANKS,, RESEARCH
INSTITUTES THAT PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN THE 1950S. AND,
ALTHOUGH MANY UNIVERSITIES HAVE DEVELOPED PROGRAMS IN
MILITARY AND POLITICAL POLICIES DURING THE LAST TWO OR

THREE DECADES, AN ALIENATION FROM ANYTHING TAINTED BY
NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST THINKING HAS DEVELOPED SINCE ABOUT THE
BEGINNING OF THE VIETNAM WAR.
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18. THE GAP HAS BEGUN TO BOTHER SOME ACADEMICS. PAUL SEABURY, A POLITICAL SCIENCE PROFESSOR AT BERKELEY, IS TRYING TO ORGANIZE A CONFERENCE ON STRATEGIC THINKING.

19. "THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN EXTERPOLATING FROM STRATEGIC CONCERNS AND DOCTRINES OF THE 1950S," SEABURY SAYS. "THE WHOLE CONCEPT OF STRATEGY HAS BEEN HIJACKED" BECAUSE MOST PEOPLE ASSOCIATE IT WITH NUCLEAR WEAPON USAGE RATHER THAN ITS MORE COMPREHENSIVE MEANING OF FITTING MEANS TO POLITICAL GOALS.

20. SEABURY THINKS A FRESH APPROACH IS NEEDED BY "PEOPLE WHO DON'T HAVE THE OLD HANGUPS" OF FOCUSING ON SUPERPOWER NUCLEAR WAR. HE HOPES TO GATHER TOGETHER SOME MILITARY HISTORIANS, SOME PRACTICING PROFESSIONAL MILITARY PEOPLE AND, FOR BALANCE AND PERSPECTIVE, SOME FOREIGNERS.

21. ONE OF THE "GOLDEN AGE" THINKERS, ALBERT WOHLSTETTER, WHO WROTE ABOUT "THE DELICATE BALANCE OF TERROR," SAYS MANY OF THE THINKERS WHO ATTENDED A 1960 CONFERENCE HAD, BY A 1974 REPEAT MEETING, BECOME IDEOLOGICALLY COMMITTED TO ARMS CONTROL GOALS OR WEAPONS COMPETITIONS OR OTHER THINGS. THAT MADE THEM STERILE AS CONCEPTUAL STRATEGISTS.

22. SCHELLING, WHO CONTRIBUTED BARGAINING THEORY TO THE ARSENAL OF U.S. STRATEGY, SAYS IT WAS EASIER TO DO CONCEPTUAL THINKING IN THE '50S WHEN THE CHANGES OF WORLD WAR II WERE FRESH AND THE NEED TO ASSIMILATE THEM WAS GENERALLY RECOGNIZED.

23. VIETNAM TURNED OFF YOUNG INTELLECTUALS, SCHELLING NOTES, AND THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION CUT DOWN THE FERTILIZING INTERPLAY BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS IN WHICH HE, KISSINGER AND OTHERS DEVELOPED. THE PENTAGON PAPERS' LEAKAGE THROUGH A RESEARCH INSTITUTE IN-UNCLASSIFIED

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CREATED THE ADMINISTRATION'S HOSTILITY TOWARD OUTSIDE THINKERS.

24. BESIDES, SCHELLING SAYS, "WE JUST DEALT WITH A RATHER GENTLEMENLY DUEL" IN THINKING OUT SOVIET-AMERICAN NUCLEAR RELATIONS IN THE '50S, WHEREAS THE WORLD NOW IS VASTLY MORE COMPLICATED.

25. KAHN, THE EBULLIENT "FUTUROLOGIST" WHO HAS DELVED INTO MANY FIELDS SINCE HE WAS "THINKING ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE" OF NUCLEAR WARFARE, SAYS THAT IN THE 1950S "WE WERE

ARGUING CONCEPTS THAT TENS OF ABLE PEOPLE WERE WORKING ON, AND WERE TRIED OUT ON THOUSANDS OF OTHERS" AS THEY WERE BEING DEVELOPED. BUT MOST OF WHAT PASSES TODAY FOR STRATEGIC THINKING IS "TOP-OF-THE-HEAD BULL SESSIONS," HE SAYS.

26. A GAP IN CONCEPTUAL THINKING ABOUT MILITARY-POLITICAL PROBLEMS SINCE THE EARLY '60S IS REALLY JUST A RETURN TO NORMAL, SINCE FEW PEOPLE EVER TAKE STRATEGIC THINKING SERIOUSLY, KAHN SAYS. THE ONLY TWO PROBLEMS THAT HE FEELS HAVE BEEN TAKEN SERIOUSLY SINCE THE '60S ARE REDUCING THE VULNERABILITY OF STRATEGIC FORCES SO AS TO PROTECT RETALIATORY CAPABILITY AND REDUCING CHANCES OF ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR.

27. BUT KAHN SAYS THERE ARE "ABOUT 200 OTHER PROBLEMS THAT ARE IMPORTANT." HE IS REFOCUSING HIS THINKING FROM CIVILIAN PROBLEMS IN ORDER TO WORK ON TWO.

28. ONE IS THE CONCEPT OF PREWAR MOBILIZATION BY OTHER COUNTRIES WHEN A SITUATION LIKE HITLER'S MILITARY BUILDUP FOR WAR DEVELOPS. THE OTHER IS THE PROBLEM OF LIVING WITH A NUCLEAR-ARMED WORLD, SINCE KAHN FEELS THE QUESTION IS NO LONGER ONE OF PREVENTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION BUT UNCLASSIFIED

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OF MANAGING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS WHEN 10 OR 20 COUNTRIES HAVE A-BOMBS -- WHICH KAHN EXPECTS WITHIN 13 YEARS.

29. KAHN FINDS "A REMARKABLE DISINTEREST IN THE BROADER ISSUES," HOWEVER. NOBODY IN THE GOVERNMENT CARES ENOUGH ABOUT THEM TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON SEEKING WAYS OF DEALING WITH THEM.

30. COLLINS ARGUES THAT IT TAKES A PERSONAL RECOGNITION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGIC THINKING TO GET ANY REAL SUPPORT FOR IT. UNLESS THE TOP OF THE GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGES EFFORTS TO DEVELOP ORIGINAL APPROACHES FOR OLD PROBLEMS, NOTHING WILL HAPPEN, HE SAYS.

31. COLLINS, AN ARMY COLONEL WHO TAUGHT AT THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE BEFORE RETIRING AND GOING TO WORK FOR THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS' CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, SAYS U.S. DEFENSE PLANNING HAS GOTTEN PRIORITIES BACKWARD: MILITARY BUDGETS AND THE ARMED FORCES POSTURES THAT GO INTO THEM ARE STRESSED WITHOUT PROPER EXAMINATION OF THE STRATEGIC THINKING THAT SHOULD SHAPE THEM.

32. FROM HIS CRAMPED, BOOK-LINED OFFICE, COLLINS IS BEGINNING TO HAVE A QUIET INFLUENCE. HIS STUDY OF THE SOVIET-U.S. MILITARY BALANCE PUBLISHED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES LAST FEBRUARY WAS IGNORED BY

MOST MEDIA, BUT IT HAD AN IMPACT ON MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WHO HAVE TO PASS ON PENTAGON BUDGETS.

33. WHILE WORKING ON A BROADER LOOK AT THE MILITARY BALANCE, COLLINS HAS BEEN PREACHING TO A WIDENING AUDIENCE OF KEY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, TOP GENERALS AND OTHERS THE NEED FOR A QUESTIONING APPROACH TO OLD STRATEGIC ASSUMPTIONS.

34. BUT THE AMERICAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, AND THE UNCLASSIFIED

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NATION AS A WHOLE, IS "ORIENTED ON ACTION, NOT IDEAS," COLLINS SAYS. AS A RESULT, "STRATEGY TAKES A BACK SEAT WHILE MILITARY SCHOOLS TEACH TACTICS. NONCONFORMISTS ARE PENALIZED, NOT PRAISED, AND NO ONE, IN OR OUT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT, STRESSES CREATIVE THINKING IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC CONCEPTS."

35. COLLINS' INFLUENTIAL STUDY OF THE SOVIET-U.S. MILITARY BALANCE IMPRESSED CONGRESSMEN WITH COMPARISONS OF TANKS AND PLANES. BUT COLLINS TRIES TO FOCUS ATTENTION ELSEWHERE. "RAW STATISTICS...ARE SIGNIFICANT ONLY IN CONTEXT," THE STUDY SAYS.

36. "WHAT EACH SIDE HAS IS LESS COGENT THAN WHAT U.S. ARMED FORCES CAN DO ON DEMAND, DESPITE SOVIET OPPOSITION." THIS BEGINS TO EDGE INTO THE IGNORED STRATEGIC FIELD.

37. THERE ARE UNITS IN THE PENTAGON THAT ARE TRYING TO THINK AHEAD, PARTICULARLY ON FUTURE TECHNOLOGY AND ITS EFFECTS ON AMERICAN MILITARY INTERESTS. THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT RECOGNIZES THEIR LIMITATIONS, HOWEVER, AND HAS SOUGHT TO USE OUTSIDE THINKERS THE WAY KISSINGER AND OTHERS WERE CONSULTANTS IN THE '50S. (END TEXT.) ROBINSON

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